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California

California High-Speed Rail

California has spent billions building high-speed rail, but passenger service has not started. Official reports show substantial construction alongside schedule and funding risks.

Reported program cost$15.62 billion
Evidence finding

Construction delays and audit findings

Source documents15View sources ↗

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California High-Speed Rail

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What was the money for?

Build a high-speed passenger railway in California.

Amount discussed in this case$15.62 billion

The $15.62 billion is reported program cost through June 2026, including related local projects, unpaid invoices and estimates for completed work. It is not all cash already paid.

Exact amount, time period and source wording

Reported program expenditures including Bookend Projects (local assistance), paid invoices, processed unpaid invoices and estimated costs for work performed; not solely cash disbursements

Period: 2026-06-30

Original plan: The 2008 benefit-cost analysis assumed Phase I revenue service from January 1, 2020; this was a planning assumption, not evidence of a contractual guarantee.

Putting the amount in context

+95%

increase in one construction contract

Construction Package 4 grew from an original contract value of about $444 million to an approved value of about $866 million. These figures run through June 2026, in the report published that August.

What this comparison means: This is one contract, not the entire railway. An approved contract increase is not the same as cash paid or proven fraud.

How we calculated this and where it comes from

(866,093,966.95 / 444,247,000 - 1) × 100

A single construction contract, not the entire railway. Approved value is not all cash paid and cost growth alone does not establish fraud.

What actually happened?

By June 2026, concrete work was complete on 65 structures and earthwork on 89 miles of the 119-mile construction area. The 2026 plan models the first full year of Merced–Bakersfield service in 2033.

Keep in mind: The railway has not opened, but substantial infrastructure exists. Findings about selected travel expenses cannot establish a fraud rate for the whole project.

Read the detailed findings

Official reports document substantial civil construction and schedule and funding risks. The separate OIG travel investigation found $800,900 lacked advance approval in its $1,152,400 approval-review scope. A different, overlapping review scope identified $595,600 in distinct unallowable payments. Imported Authority reports contain $7,672,143,008.77 in selected prime-contractor payment records from November 2018 through September 2026, after excluding repeated or conflicting rows. The archive omits September 2021. They identify payment dates and invoice references, while invoice copies and delivery approvals remain to be connected.

Reported status: Under construction, with no high-speed passenger service yet. June 2026 reporting lists 65 structures with concrete work complete and 89 miles of guideway earthworks complete across the 119-mile civil-construction area. The 2026 plan models the first full year of Merced–Bakersfield service in 2033.

Substantial infrastructure has been built. Program expenditure is not a fraud-loss finding. Travel-review categories overlap and cannot be extrapolated to the program; the revised OIG table replaces its earlier calculation.

What was built, and what did the contract cost?

Construction Package 4 is one section of the California railway. These figures cover that construction contract, not the whole project.

Reported through 2026-06-30

The reported work

The report lists final contract completion in August 2025. “Guideway complete” means earthworks and rough grading, not an operating railway.

Structures11 of 11 structures
Groundwork along the route21.1 of 21.2 miles
Utilities moved133 of 133 moves

How the agreed cost changed

Original agreement
$444.25 million
Approved contract changes
$421.85 million
Contract value after changes
$866.09 million

+94.96% compared with the original agreement

The source reports $866.09 million in approved invoices. The amount actually paid has not been matched payment by payment in this file.

A higher contract cost is a reason to examine the changes. It does not, by itself, establish fraud.

Exact amounts, source and limits of this comparison

Construction Package 4 only — not the full rail program. Original contract including provisional sums, compared with approved invoices through June 2026.

Original contract
$444,247,000
Approved change orders
$421,846,966.95
Approved invoices
$866,093,966.95

Amounts above are rounded for readability. The original contract is a historical price for its original scope, not an independent valuation of the finished work. The increase equals recorded change orders; their approval alone does not establish reasonable cost. Scope changes, inflation, delay and site conditions need separate review. Some utilities and parcels were descoped.

Authority August 2026 Central Valley Status Report, CP4 overview (page 37)2026-08
Explore a cost assumption

What if the same work could have been delivered for a different price? Enter a low and high estimate to see the arithmetic. These are your assumptions, not an independent valuation.

Enter both estimates to compare them with the approved invoice amount. Zero is a valid assumption.

This difference is not an estimate of fraud. A fair comparison must include the same land, design, utilities, changes in the work, completed quantities and price dates. The original agreement is a historical price for its original scope.

Can we follow the payments?

A report can tell us the total. To follow the money, we also need to connect each bill to a payment and to what was received.

Payment records and reporting periods · reviewed November 9, 2026

What could a 3-month funding checkpoint have changed?

Trace the money that went out after a checkpoint. The Receipts Act could require independent progress approval before the next funding release.

Gross payments potentially stopped under these assumptions$7.67 billion

Assumes review could prevent 100% of later spending. This includes payments for real work. Actual savings depend on which costs were avoidable, contract obligations, recoveries and assets kept.

California High-Speed Rail ↗

Selected prime contractor payments issued by the Authority. November 2018–September 2026, with September 2021 absent from the linked reports.

Official groundbreaking
Jan 6, 2015
Funding checkpoint
Apr 6, 2015
Cash spending definitely after it
$7,672,143,009

2,990 included records · 2,985 with payment-issue dates

Inspect the amounts, scope and source documents

One repeated $1,087,835.48 entry was removed. Two conflicting $30,000 entries sharing a payment reference are held out. Six spreadsheet serial dates were converted. Five entries only support a payment month.

Payments issued can reach contractors later. This selection covers major contractors, including construction and consulting, rather than the entire program.

Invoice references identify bills, but the underlying invoice copies and independently verified delivery records have not been joined here.

A payment after a warning can pay for legitimate completed work. Avoidability requires contract, progress and recovery review.

  • $95,245,679 · Dec 24, 2025DRAGADOS FLATIRON JV · Contract HSR13-57 · 09259393-000602961Invoice reference 00133
  • $94,316,862 · Jun 21, 2024DRAGADOS FLATIRON JV · Contract HSR13-57 · 09-249104Invoice reference 00112
  • $90,000,000 · Jun 19, 2026DRAGADOS FLATIRON JV · Contract HSR13-57 · 09262491-000633141Invoice reference 140

The lower amount uses records entirely after the checkpoint, counting indistinguishable repeated rows once. The upper amount also includes periods crossing the checkpoint and unresolved repeated rows. Amounts are never spread evenly across unknown payment dates. Missing records remain outside the total. The selected review date may be later than the first warning.

This reported total includes unpaid invoices and estimates for work completed. It is not all cash already paid.

Complete invoice-to-payment links

Whole amount shown$15.62 billion
Invoice
What was charged.
Payment record
What was paid.
Delivery record
What was received.
0% traced to invoices and payments in this file0% of the stated $15.62 billion is linked here to an invoice and payment record. $0 is linked to invoices and payments; $0 also has delivery acceptance. $15,622,219,594 has no matched invoice and payment in this case file.

Invoice + payment record

$0 linked here

No matching invoice and payment records have been added to this file.

The circle shows the share of the displayed total with those records. Blue means linked here; gray means not linked here.

0% means no matching records are linked in this file. It does not describe every record the government holds or prove that money was lost or stolen.

Help make invoices, payments and proof of delivery public.

Support the Receipts Act
How this is measured and which records are linked

Dated payment or cash-flow records are shown separately on this page. Invoice-to-payment coverage measures this collection only and requires linked invoice documents for the same scope. Reported program expenditures including Bookend Projects (local assistance), paid invoices, processed unpaid invoices and estimated costs for work performed; not solely cash disbursements.

Only invoice and payment records tied to this same amount and scope count. Delivery coverage also requires a linked acceptance record. A report showing a total does not count as an individual receipt.

Invoice, payment and delivery linked
$0
Invoice and payment linked; delivery not linked
$0
No matched invoice and payment in this file
$15,622,219,594

0 matching invoice/payment records; 0 also link to delivery.

No individual invoice-to-payment records are registered in this file yet. This does not establish that those records do not exist elsewhere.

What is still missing?

For each payment and contract increase, what work was completed, inspected and accepted?

Which records would help answer this?

The approval review covered selected travel payments; the separate unallowable-expense review used a different scope. Neither is a representative sample of the rail program. Their amounts cannot be divided into each other to calculate a loss rate or extrapolated to the program total. Public construction and expenditure summaries do not provide a complete invoice-to-delivery crosswalk here. Dated spending records are imported on this page. The underlying invoice copies, independently accepted milestones, remaining payer scopes and recoveries still need to be connected. Payment timing by itself does not identify avoidable cost.

  • Link contracts, change orders, invoices and payments to independently accepted construction quantities.
  • Publish approved scope, cost and schedule changes with responsible approvals.
  • Reconcile contractor payment totals with delivered assets and operational service milestones.

These records have not all been assembled here. They may exist elsewhere. Personal details should stay protected.

Sources and research notes (15 documents)

These documents support the case. A source document can describe many payments; it is not itself an itemized receipt.

  1. Authority August 2026 Capital Outlay Budget and Expenditures Report, page 2

    hsr.ca.gov · 2026-08

  2. Final 2026 Business Plan

    hsr.ca.gov · 2026-06-01

  3. OIG substantiated consultant travel investigation, revised tables 2 and 3

    hsr.ca.gov · 2026-09-15

  4. OIG Review of 2026 Business Plan

    hsr.ca.gov · 2026-07-31

  5. Authority Project Overview

    hsr.ca.gov · Accessed 2026-11-08

  6. 2008 Business Plan technical benefit-cost analysis, page 3

    hsr.ca.gov · 2008

  7. Authority August 2026 Central Valley Status Report: construction progress and CP4 contract

    hsr.ca.gov · 2026-08

  8. California High-Speed Rail prime contractor payment report 2018–2021

    hsr.ca.gov · Reviewed 2026-11-09

  9. California High-Speed Rail prime contractor payment report 2022

    hsr.ca.gov · Reviewed 2026-11-09

  10. California High-Speed Rail prime contractor payment report 2023

    hsr.ca.gov · Reviewed 2026-11-09

  11. California High-Speed Rail prime contractor payment report 2024

    hsr.ca.gov · Reviewed 2026-11-09

  12. California High-Speed Rail prime contractor payment report 2025

    hsr.ca.gov · Reviewed 2026-11-09

  13. California High-Speed Rail prime contractor payment report 2026

    hsr.ca.gov · Reviewed 2026-11-09

  14. 2016 Business Plan, January 6, 2015 groundbreaking

    hsr.ca.gov · 2016

  15. California State Auditor 2018-108

    information.auditor.ca.gov · 2018-11-15

Research cutoff: November 9, 2026. Older reports may not include later changes. Read our methodology.