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United States

Pandemic small-business loans: PPP and COVID EIDL

The Small Business Administration’s inspector general estimated more than $200 billion in potentially fraudulent pandemic loans. The agency disputed that estimate and offered a much lower one.

Potential fraud estimated by the inspector generalOver $200 billion
Evidence finding

Disputed estimate of potential fraud

Source documents2View sources ↗

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Pandemic small-business loans: PPP and COVID EIDL

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What was the money for?

Help small businesses meet payroll and other needs during the pandemic through the Paycheck Protection Program and COVID Economic Injury Disaster Loans.

Amount discussed in this caseOver $200 billion

The June 2023 figure is an estimate of suspicious money paid through two pandemic loan programs. It is not a total of court-proven losses; the agency’s competing estimate was about $36 billion.

Exact amount, time period and source wording

SBA Inspector General estimate of potentially fraudulent disbursements; not a court-established loss

Period: 2023-06-27

Putting the amount in context

At least 17%

of loan dollars flagged as potential fraud by the inspector general

The inspector general estimated that at least $17 out of every $100 paid through the two programs was potentially fraudulent.

What this comparison means: This is a disputed estimate of potential fraud, not court-proven loss or proof against every borrower.

How we calculated this and where it comes from

Use SBA OIG's published 'at least 17 percent' estimate rather than recomputing rounded headline totals.

Potential fraud estimate, not adjudicated loss. SBA disputed the OIG methodology and produced a much lower estimate; display that disagreement with the figure.

What actually happened?

The inspector general published a broad estimate, while investigations and recoveries continued separately. A later federal review also found that many fraud referrals lacked usable information.

Keep in mind: A flagged loan is not proof of fraud, and the two agency estimates use different assessments.

Read the detailed findings

SBA OIG estimated over $200 billion in potentially fraudulent PPP and COVID EIDL disbursements. GAO records SBA's competing estimate of around $36 billion in likely fraud. The agencies used different assessments; neither figure is a set of final court judgments.

Reported status: SBA OIG published a program-wide estimate; investigations and recoveries are separate from the estimate.

Potential-fraud flags do not establish guilt for every borrower. SBA disputed aspects of the OIG estimate. Program estimates overlap the individual cases within them.

Can we follow the payments?

A report can tell us the total. To follow the money, we also need to connect each bill to a payment and to what was received.

Early-intervention illustration · estimated timing

What could earlier intervention have changed?

Defaults to SBA’s roughly $36 billion estimate of likely fraud. An alternative uses a rounded $200 billion from SBA OIG’s disputed potential-fraud estimate. The modeled window spans the combined programs. PPP lending ended earlier than EIDL, so equal monthly losses are a simplifying assumption.

Modeled gross payments avoided$32 billion

Assumes action after 3 months could prevent 100% of the remaining amount. Effectiveness remains unmeasured. This uses equal monthly amounts because actual payment dates are missing.

Kept separate from the government-wide estimate, which can cover these federal losses too.

See the calculation, dates and evidence limits

2020-03 through 2022-05 · 27 months

$36 billion × 24 / 27 × 100%

The source gives a total and a time window. This illustration spreads the amount evenly across that window because individual payment dates are unavailable.

Net savings require evidence of the costs actually avoidable, recoveries, repayment obligations and the cost of oversight. Essential services and payments legally owed must remain protected.

Publish the payment trail, independently check progress and pause future unearned releases when the evidence warrants it.

See the Receipts Act proposal ↗

Complete invoice-to-payment links

Whole amount shownOver $200 billion
No spending percentage

This figure estimates potentially fraudulent payments. It is not the total paid by these programs.

0 matching invoice and payment records linked here.

This measures records linked in this file, not every record government holds, and does not establish fraud.

Help make invoices, payments and proof of delivery public.

Support the Receipts Act
How this is measured and which records are linked

This file currently links summary-level sources, with no itemized invoice-to-payment records registered against this amount. The pie measures this collection only. SBA Inspector General estimate of potentially fraudulent disbursements; not a court-established loss. Preserve the source qualifier: this is not an exact spending denominator.

Only invoice and payment records tied to this same amount and scope count. Delivery coverage also requires a linked acceptance record. A report showing a total does not count as an individual receipt.

A positive, comparable dollar total is required to calculate coverage.

Invoice, payment and delivery linked
$0
Invoice and payment linked; delivery not linked
$0
No matched invoice and payment in this file
No comparable total

0 matching invoice/payment records; 0 also link to delivery.

No individual invoice-to-payment records are registered in this file yet. This does not establish that those records do not exist elsewhere.

What is still missing?

Which flagged loans were proved fraudulent, which were cleared, and how much was recovered?

Which records would help answer this?

GAO reported in March 2025 that about 2 million of almost 3 million COVID EIDL referrals to SBA OIG were not actionable because of missing data or quality problems. This is a referral-quality finding, not a percentage of missing financial receipts. A loan-to-payment-to-outcome reconciliation is not assembled here.

  • Publish a privacy-protected loan-level reconciliation of approval, disbursement, forgiveness, ineligibility determination, appeal and recovery amounts.
  • Publish the required data fields, rejection reasons and remediation status for non-actionable OIG referrals.
  • Give independent auditors secure access to supporting identity and business records; publish aggregate validation results and sampling methods.

These records have not all been assembled here. They may exist elsewhere. Personal details should stay protected.

Can we estimate how much was wasted or stolen?

This file does not establish an independent value for everything delivered. Subtracting a guessed value from a headline amount would not establish fraud. A sound estimate needs matching costs, delivered results and evidence about why any money was lost.

Sources and research notes (2 documents)

These documents support the case. A source document can describe many payments; it is not itself an itemized receipt.

  1. SBA OIG Report 23-09: COVID-19 Pandemic EIDL and PPP Loan Fraud Landscape

    legacy.sba.gov · 2023-06-27

  2. GAO: Improved Controls Needed for Referring Likely Fraud in SBA's Pandemic Loan Programs

    files.gao.gov · 2025-03-24

Research cutoff: November 9, 2026. Older reports may not include later changes. Read our methodology.